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A huge research effort is going on in order to develop connected and 
automated vehicles. Small-scale trials of automated vehicles in real traffic 
are already taking place. Can the societal impacts of a transition to fully 
connected and automated vehicles be predicted? This question has been 
studied in the Horizon2020 project Levitate. To predict the impacts of 
connected and automated vehicles, one must first identify and describe 
potential impacts. A list of 33 potential impacts, classified as direct, 
systemic and wider was developed. A survey was made of methods that can 
be applied in order to quantify and predict these impacts. Not all potential 
impacts can be predicted with any confidence. There is, first of all, large 
uncertainty about when and how long the transition to connected and 
automated vehicles will be. It is also impossible to predict some potentially 
quite important impacts, e.g. whether the transition to automation will be 
associated with a transition to various forms of shared mobility or whether 
individual ownership and use of vehicles will continue at present levels. 
Another important aspect which is difficult to predict is whether automated 
vehicles will continue to have internal combustion engines or be electric or 
based on fuel cells. Several methods must be applied to predict the impacts 
of connected and automated vehicles. As far as impacts on traffic 
operations are concerned, various forms of traffic simulation have been 
widely applied. Broadly speaking, connected and automated vehicles are 
expected to lead to increased road capacity, fewer accidents and less 
emissions. Increased road capacity may in turn generate induced travel 
demand, which to some extent will fill up the new capacity. Road safety is 
likely to be improved, but there is large uncertainty about how non-
automated road users and automated vehicles can interact in ways that 
maintain current safety levels or, preferably, improve safety. It is, for 
example, not known how non-automated road users will adapt behaviour 






Det pågår omfattende forskning med sikte på å utvikle selvkjørende biler. Forsøk i virkelig trafikk i mindre skal 
finner allerede sted. Kan man forutsi de samfunnsmessige virkninger av selvkjørende biler? Dette spørsmålet 
står sentralt i det pågående Horizon2020 prosjekt Levitate, som denne artikkelen bygger på. Det er utarbeidet 
en liste over mulige virkninger av selvkjørende biler. Til sammen 33 mulige virkninger ble identifisert. 
Mulighetene for å kvantifisere og predikere virkningene ble undersøkt. Det er ikke mulig å predikere alle 
virkninger. For det første vet man ikke når de selvkjørende biler kommer på markedet og hvor lang tid det vil 
ta før de erstatter biler med fører. For det andre vet man ikkde om selvkjørende biler stort sett vil bli benyttet 
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individuelt, eller om det vil skje en overgang til ulike former for delemobilitet. For det tredje vet man ikke om 
de selvkjørende biler vil ha forbrenningsmotor eller bli elektriske. For de virkninger der tallfesting og prediksjon 
er mulig, har en rekke metoder vært benyttet. Ulike former for trafikksimulering er en vanlig metode foir å 
studere de trafikale virkninger av selvkjørende biler. Det hersker enighet om at selvkjørende biler vil kunne 
utnytte vegkapasiteten bedre og redusere antall trafikkulykker og forurensende utslipp. Det er fortsatt stor 
usikkerhet knyttet til hvordan selvkjørende biler kan samhandle med fotgjengere og syklister. 
 
Background and research problem 
There are great expectations about the potential societal benefits of connected and automated vehicles 
(Fagnant and Kockelman 2015, Herrmann, Brenner and Stadler 2018). Vehicle automation and connectivity is 
expected to reduce congestion, thereby reducing the need for road investments, reduce energy consumption 
and vehicle emissions and substantially reduce the number of accidents. Fagnant and Kockelman (2015) find 
that benefits exceed costs by a wide margin. 
 
Other analyses are more skeptical. Thus, Hoadley (2018) note that several of the potential impacts of 
automated vehicles are not obviously favourable. In particular, an increase in vehicle kilometres and a 
reduction of walking and cycling goes against current political objectives in many cities. 
  
With respect to safety benefits, the report notes that: “Achieving road safety benefits presumes that systems 
are always on, always fully operational and will “fail safe”. This is a big ask: In 2017, connected cars can be 
hacked; transport booking systems overbooked; fleet management systems can fail; power and 
communications systems have outages; components fail; and navigation guidance is not infallible.” 
 
These observations are correct. Automated systems need to have a very high reliability in order to perform 
better than human drivers. However, it should not be forgotten that human operators sometimes voluntarily 
choose to degrade their performance and erode their safety margins by drinking and driving, speeding, 
tailgating, or otherwise adopting a behaviour that involves an avoidable risk. Speeding, drinking and driving, 
and non-use of seat belts contribute to about 30-40 % of all traffic fatalities, and automated vehicles may 
eliminate this contribution. 
 
What are the potential impacts of connected and automated vehicles? How well known are these impacts? 
Can they be quantified? Can uncertainty be indicated? Are some impacts more uncertain than other impacts? 
Can the impacts be converted to monetary terms as a basis for cost-benefit analysis? 
 
This paper will discuss these questions based on research conducted in the H2020 project Levitate (Societal 
impacts of connected and automated vehicles). The paper is to a large extent based on three deliverables of 
the Levitate project (Elvik et al. 2019, Elvik et al. 2020, Elvik 2020). 
 
 
A taxonomy of potential impacts 
A taxonomy of potential impacts of connected and automated vehicles was developed by synthesising 
previously published taxonomies of potential impacts of connected and automated vehicles. Impacts were 
classified along two dimensions: 
 
1. Their spatial and temporal extent of occurrence. 
2. Whether they are intended (primary) or unintended (secondary). 
 
Table 1 lists the impacts that were included in the taxonomy. With respect to the first dimension, a distinction 
was made between direct impacts, systemic impacts and wider impacts. Direct impacts are noticed by each 
road user on each trip. An example is changes in travel time or in monetary outlays associated with making a 
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trip. Vehicle ownership cost was classified as a direct impact since it is noticed by each vehicle owner when 
buying and keeping a vehicle. Seven direct impacts were identified. 
 
Table 1: Potential impacts of connected and automated vehicles 
Impact Description of impact 
Direct impacts (micro) 
Travel time Duration of a trip between a given origin and a given destination 
Travel comfort Subjective rating of the level of comfort on a given trip 
Valuation of time Willingness-to-pay for reduced travel time 
Vehicle operating cost Direct outlays for operating a vehicle per kilometre of travel 
Vehicle ownership cost The cost of buying and keeping a vehicle 
Access to travel The opportunity of taking a trip whenever and wherever wanted 
Individual route choice Technology to support route choice on a given trip 
Systemic impacts (macro) 
Amount of travel Vehicle kilometres or person kilometres of travel per year in an area 
Road capacity The maximum number of vehicles that can pass a section of road per unit 
of time 
Congestion Delays to traffic as a result of high traffic volume 
Infrastructure wear The rate per unit of time at which is road is worn down 
Infrastructure design Equipping roads with technology for vehicle-to-infrastructure 
communication 
Modal split of travel The distribution of trips between modes of transport 
Optimising route choice Directing traffic to routes that minimise overall generalised costs of travel 
Vehicle ownership rate Percent of household owning 0, 1, 2, etc. vehicles 
Shared mobility Car sharing or ride sharing; shared use of a vehicle by many users 
Vehicle utilisation rate Share of time a vehicle is used; share of seats in use 
Parking space Areas designated to parking 
Traffic data generation Data produced by connected and automated vehicles 
Wider impacts 
Trust in technology Share of population willing to use connected and automated vehicles 
Road safety Number and severity of accidents 
Propulsion energy Source of energy used to move vehicles 
Energy efficiency Rate at which propulsion energy is converted to movement 
Vehicle emissions Emissions (by chemical) in micrograms or grams per kilometre driven 
Air pollution Concentration of pollutants per cubic meter of air 
Noise pollution Number of individuals exposed to noise above a certain threshold 
Public health Population incidence of morbidity and mortality; subjectively rated health 
state 
Employment Number of people employed in different occupations 
Geographic accessibility Time used to reach given destinations from different origins 
Inequality in transport Skewness in the distribution of travel behaviour according to social status 
Commuting distances Length of daily trips to and from work 
Land use Density of land use for different purposes 
Public finances Income and expenses of the public sector 
 
Systemic impacts are system-wide impacts occurring within the transport system. These impacts include, for 
example, changes in road capacity and congestion and changes in the modal split of travel. A total of twelve 
systemic impacts were identified. 
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Wider impacts may originate in the transport system but occur mainly outside the transport system in society 
at large. Examples of wider impacts are changes in employment and land use. A total of fourteen wider impacts 
were identified. In total, Table 1 lists 33 potential impacts. 
 
It should be noted that there is an element of arbitrariness in any taxonomy. As an example, consider the 
potential impacts of connected and automated vehicles on road safety. An accident can be classified both as 
a direct impact (it happens to a road user on a given trip), as a systemic impact (it will normally delay other 
traffic), and as a wider impact (some impacts of accidents occur outside the transport system, like medical 
treatment and rehabilitation). 
 
Some impacts form clusters. Thus, propulsion energy, energy efficiency, vehicle emissions, air pollution and 
public health, are closely related to each other and can be regarded as a causal chain. In a case like this, it is 
the end of the causal chain, changes in public health, that is of greatest interest.  
 
The potential impacts of connected and automated vehicles can be both intended and unintended. Intended 
impacts are referred to as primary. The intended impacts include: increased road capacity, less travel delay, 
fewer accidents and less pollution. Connected and automated vehicles are widely believed to bring about all 
these impacts. However, new technology often leads to behavioural adaptation that partly offsets its intended 
impacts. Vehicle automation may, by reducing the generalised costs of travel, induce increased travel demand 
and a shift from walking, cycling and public transport towards individual use of cars. Many city governments 
are aiming for exactly the opposite: less individual use of cars and more walking, cycling and travel by public 
transport. 
 
Litman (2020) states that: “It could go either way. By increasing non-drivers’ vehicle travel, increasing travel 
convenience and comfort, reducing vehicle operating costs, generating empty travel, and encouraging longer-
distance commutes and more sprawled development, they (automated vehicles) can increase vehicle travel. 
… Alternatively, autonomous operation may facilitate vehicle sharing, allowing households to reduce vehicle 
ownership and vehicle travel.” 
 
It is likewise uncertain whether automated vehicles will be electric or run on fossil fuels. Electric cars are 
becoming more competitive and cheaper to operate. It would therefore seem more likely than not that 
automated cars will be electric. 
 
Quantifying and assigning monetary values to impacts 
One of the research objectives of Levitate is to conduct cost-benefit analyses of policies intended to ensure 
that connected and automated vehicles are introduced in a way that maximises their societal benefits. In order 
to perform such analyses, the potential impacts of connected and automated vehicles must be quantified and 
converted to monetary terms. Furthermore, there must be a method for developing policy options that 
enables identification of the policy option that maximises the societal benefits of connected and automated 
vehicles. 
 
Table 2 classifies the potential impacts of connected and automated vehicles identified in Table 1 with respect 
to whether they can be quantified and converted to monetary terms (Elvik et al. 2019, Elvik et al. 2020, Elvik 
2020). It is seen that most impacts can be quantified, and a majority of impacts converted to monetary terms. 
However, a universally accepted scale for quantification does not always exist. Thus, travel comfort is to a large 
extent a subjective experience; what one traveller finds quite comfortable another will find uncomfortable. 
Factors that have been found to influence the feeling of comfort, like temperature, humidity, noise level and 
bumpiness can be quantified, but people react differently to these factors and will therefore have different 
opinions about the importance of changing them. 
 
Rune Elvik 
https://journals.aau.dk/index.php/djtr ISSN 2596-9196 5 
The modal split of travel is another case in point. It is often quantified in terms of the percentage distribution 
of trips between different modes of travel. The percentage of trips on foot or by bike may then be quite high. 
If, however, modal split is quantified in terms of kilometres travelled, the percentage done on foot or by bike 
will usually be very low. 
 
Other impacts are multidimensional, like individual route choice. On a holiday trip, a route may be taken for 
its scenic beauty, not because it is the shortest route. Thus, travel time, vehicle operating cost, scenic beauty 
and availability of roadside rest areas are just some of the characteristics of a route. While most of these 
characteristics may be quantified, a meaningful conversion of them to monetary terms is difficult. 
 
The amount of travel can be quantified as person kilometres. The monetary impacts associated with travel are 
the generalised costs of travel, which is the sum of all sacrifices made when travelling, converted to monetary 
terms, and the benefits of travel. The latter are usually stated in terms of the consumer surplus. In most cases, 
the consumer surplus associated with a certain amount of travel will be unknown. This is because the demand 
function for travel is unknown. It is usually only possible to estimate the change in consumer surplus associated 
with a change in the generalised costs of travel which leads to a change in the amount of travel. 
 
No monetary valuation has been assigned to road capacity. It is assumed that changes in road capacity, or a 
more effective utilisation of it, are manifested in terms of changes in the amount of travel or travel time and 
thus captured by the monetary valuation of these impacts. 
 
Monetary valuations are missing for some important wider impacts of connected and automated vehicles. This 
includes trust in automation technology, changes in employment, changes in inequality in transport and 
changes in land use. If trust in the technology breaks down, in particular when connected and automated 
vehicles are already in widespread use, the whole transport system may cease to function. This would 
obviously have very extensive societal impacts. One cannot image that society will keep a ”backup” transport 
system relying on manual vehicles. Thus, relying on a technology that is exposed to the risk of cyber attacks 
makes the transport system more vulnerable. 
 
Vehicle automation may have extensive impacts on employment. When full automation is attained, drivers 
will no longer be needed. A lower number of accidents means less business for car repairs and vehicle insurers. 
If automated vehicles comply with all rules of the road, traffic police will no longer be needed. Worries about 
technology taking away jobs are not new; yet in the long run they have been found to be groundless. Not more 
than hundred years ago, more than half the work force was employed in agriculture. Today, the percentage is 
less than 2 % in many countries. Nobody deplores the enormous productivity growth in agriculture; it has 
benefitted everybody. It is the nature of economic development that the structure of employment changes. 
In 1930, there will still quite a few blacksmiths serving horses used in agriculture, but no computer engineers 
or software programmers. Today there are no blacksmiths, but lots of computer engineers and programmers. 
 
One of the potential benefits of automated vehicles is that they make independent mobility possible for people 
who cannot drive a car. This will reduce inequality in the access to mobility. On the other hand, automated 
cars are expected to be more expensive than current cars and, at least initially, only affordable for the 
wealthiest. This may increase inequality in transport. No matter whether inequality is reduced or increased, it 
is impossible to assign a monetary value to it. One may perhaps assume that there is a widespread preference 
for less inequality. However, whether such a preference exists and whether it can be meaningfully expressed 
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Table 2: Potential impacts of connected and automated vehicles that can be quantified and converted to monetary terms 
Direct impacts Quantification (yes/no) Monetary valuation (yes/no) 
Travel time Yes Yes 
Travel comfort No standard scale Perhaps 
Valuation of time Yes Yes 
Vehicle operating cost Yes Yes 
Vehicle ownership cost Yes Yes 
Access to travel Yes Perhaps 
Individual route choice Aspects of it No 
Systemic impacts    
Amount of travel Yes Yes 
Road capacity Yes No 
Congestion Yes Yes 
Infrastructure wear Yes Yes 
Infrastructure design Yes Yes 
Modal split of travel Yes No 
Optimising route choice Yes Yes 
Vehicle ownership rate Yes No 
Shared mobility Yes Yes 
Vehicle utilisation rate Yes Yes 
Parking space Yes Yes 
Traffic data generation Yes No 
Wider impacts   
Trust in technology Yes No 
Road safety Yes Yes 
Propulsion energy Yes Yes 
Energy efficiency Yes Yes 
Vehicle emissions Yes Yes 
Air pollution Yes Yes 
Noise pollution Yes Yes 
Public health Yes Yes 
Employment Yes No 
Geographic accessibility Yes Yes 
Inequality in transport Yes No 
Commuting distances Yes Yes 
Land use Yes No 
Public finances Yes Yes 
 
Finally, changes in land use are difficult to predict and convert to monetary terms. Litman (2020), for example, 
states that with current policies vehicle travel and urban sprawl are likely to increase. As noted above, many 
city governments want to curb urban sprawl, discourage individual use of cars and encourage walking, cycling 
and public transport. More compact cities, i.e. cities with shorter mean travel distances, may promote public 
health (Stevenson et al. 2016). Improved public health may in turn be converted to monetary terms. Yet, it is 
not a priori clear whether building more compact cities maximises the benefits of connected and automated 
cars. Land, and house building, is more expensive in cities than in the countryside. Making cities more compact 
is therefore a matter of weighing costs and benefits.  
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How have impacts been quantified? 
One widely applied method for studying potential impacts of new vehicle technologies, in particular with the 
aim of quantifying impacts, is traffic simulation. The results of traffic simulation studies and mathematical 
models of traffic are strongly influenced by the assumptions made. Given the sensitivity of the results of 
simulations to the assumptions made; and given the fact that these assumptions vary between studies, one 
might wonder whether trying to formally synthesise the results of simulation studies makes sense at all. This 
paper argues that it makes sense if the results are consistent and if functions fitted to the results are a fair 
summary of them. 
 
An example: Safety on motorways 
In traffic simulation studies, traffic conflicts are usually used as indicator of safety. Various studies have tried 
to find formulas for converting the number of conflicts to an expected number of accidents. No such 
conversion was attempted in LEVITATE. It was judged that the analyses were more replicable in future research 
by stating results in the metric used by original studies. The definition of a conflict most commonly used is 
time-to-collision below a certain threshold, often 1.5 seconds. The time to collision is the time remaining 
before two road users collide if they do not change speed or direction.  
 
A number of studies made by Kockelman et al. (2016), Olia et al. (2016), Li et al. (2017), Rahman et al. (2018), 
Yang et al. (2018), Papadoulis et al. (2019) and Rahman et al. (2019) have simulated changes in the number of 
rear-end and lane-change conflicts on motorways as a result of the introduction of connected and automated 
vehicles. Figure 1 presents data points extracted from these studies. 
 
Figure 1: Change in rear-end and lane-change conflicts associated with vehicle automation 
 
 
The data points are widely dispersed, but consistently indicate that the number of conflicts will be reduced at 
high levels of market penetration of automated vehicles. There is a cluster of data points indicating that 
conflicts will almost be eliminated at 100% market penetration, and three data points indicating smaller 
reductions of the number of conflicts. To summarise the main tendency of the studies and indicate 
uncertainty, curves were fitted to the data points applying the following rules: 
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1. The form of the function best fitting the data points was identified. The following functional forms 
were compared: linear, exponential, power and polynomial. Goodness-of-fit was assessed in terms of 
R-squared. 
2. The parameters of the best-fitting function were adjusted so that it had an initial value of 100 at 0% 
market penetration and a predicted value equal to the median value of the data points at 100% market 
penetration. 
3. Functions representing the lower limit for the change in the number of conflicts and the upper limit 
were fitted, using the same functional form as for the best fitting function. 
A second-degree polynomial was found to best fit the data points. A third- degree polynomial fitted marginally 
better. It was rejected because it indicated an increase in the number of conflicts at high market penetration 
rates for connected and automated vehicles, which is implausible. The second-degree polynomial was 
adjusted to start at the value of 100 at 0% market penetration and end at the median value of the eleven data 
points for 100% market penetration, which was 7.1. Upper and lower curves were fitted so as to include most 
data points. Figure 2 shows the curves that were fitted. 
 
Figure 2: Uncertainty in dose-response curve for rear-end and lane-change conflicts 
 
 
While some data points are located outside the upper and lower limit curves, these curves pass close to the 
data points and are therefore a representative summary of the dispersion of the data points. Thus, even when 
data points are as widely dispersed as this case, it is possible to summarise their main tendency and the 
uncertainty surrounding this by means of dose-response curves. 
 
It is nevertheless striking that the results of the studies are so widely dispersed. One might think that 
motorways are the easiest type of traffic environment for introducing connected and automated cars. There 
are no at-grade junctions, no sharp curves and no steep hills. There are no pedestrians or cyclists or slow-
moving motor vehicles. In normal traffic operations, cars move in the same direction at roughly the same 
speed. Except for running off the road, the only conflicts that may occur are those involving rear-end collisions 
and lane changes. These conflicts involve only changes in relative speed and changes in direction. Yet, the 
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estimates of the reduction in conflicts, applying the curves in Figure 2, range from 35% reduction to 99% 
reduction, with 93% reduction as the best estimate. This range should not be interpreted as a confidence 
interval in the statistical sense. It is rather a manifestation of the huge differences in results that may arise as 
a result of the choice of parameters in traffic simulation. 
 
There is currently no business standard for parameters like acceleration, deceleration, headway or space 
required for a lane change. At some point such standards will have to be developed. Otherwise cars from 
different manufacturers may behave very differently and not interact efficiently or safely. 
 
How can impacts be valued in monetary terms? 
Monetary valuations should ideally speaking include all potential impacts of connected and automated 
vehicles in order to support cost-benefit analyses. As noted above, monetary valuations are lacking for a 
number of important impacts. Currently available monetary impacts can be placed in three main groups: 
 
1. Valuations of the societal impacts of connected and automated vehicles, such as changes in travel 
time, in the number of accidents and vehicle emissions. 
2. Estimates of the costs of connected and automated vehicles.  
3. Estimates of willingness-to-pay for connected and automated vehicles. 
 
Valuations of potential impacts on travel time, accidents and emissions are available at the European level, 
and, for accidents and travel time, for each European country (Wardman et al. 2016, Wijnen et al. 2017, Essen 
et al. 2019). For these impacts, recommended valuations have been developed. It is nevertheless necessary 
to make a choice about whether to apply country-specific valuations or average values for Europe. This choice 
can make a big difference for the results of cost-benefit analyses. If country-specific values are used, benefits 
will have a lower value in countries with a relatively low income (e.g. Greece or Portugal) than in countries 
with a comparatively high level of income (e.g. Luxembourg, Norway). 
 
Estimates of the costs of automated vehicles vary considerably, but most studies estimate that an automated 
car will be between 10,000 and 40,000 US dollars more expensive than a manual car. This is a considerable 
increase in the price of a car. In 2014, the average price of a new car sold in the United States was about 34,000 
US dollars. The price of a new car would more than double if the high cost estimate of 40,000 US dollars turns 
out to be correct. 
 
Would there be demand for automated vehicles if they are priced 10,000 to 40,000 US dollars above current 
cars? Several studies have tried to estimate willingness-to-pay for automated cars. Elvik (2020) summarises 
these studies. Results vary, but the range of estimates is narrower than most studies of hypothetical 
willingness-to-pay find. A demand function which indicates the typical results of the studies is shown in Figure 
3. 
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Figure 3: Hypothetical demand curve for automated cars 
 
 
Even at an additional price of 40,000 US dollars, a few people would be willing to buy an automated car. If the 
increase in price is 10,000 US dollars, 20% of respondents in willingness-to-pay surveys indicate that would 
buy the car. About 30% of respondents indicate zero willingness-to-pay. This group probably includes 
passionate drivers who are not willing to give up driving manually. An issue which has been discussed, is 
whether manual driving should be banned once automated cars can be shown to be safer than manual cars 
(Sparrow og Howard 2017, Müller og Gogoll 2020). The main argument for banning manual driving is that it is 
an avoidable, and therefore unacceptable, risk once automated cars are safer. However, avoidable risks are 
tolerated today. Riding a motorcycle is an avoidable risk, but it is permitted. It seems unlikely both that 
motorcycles will be automated and that there will be a market for them if they were to be automated. If 
avoidable risks are to be banned, motorcycles should have been so long ago. 
 
However, the fact that moral philosophers are discussing a ban on manual driving shows that the introduction 
of automated vehicles may raise several difficult policy choices. At the current state of knowledge, all these 
choices are made under uncertainty, i.e. while many of the potential impacts of connected and automated 
cars can be identified, both the direction and magnitude of many impacts remains uncertain, and probability 
distributions of likely impacts cannot be developed, as the probability of most potential outcomes – for 
example a growth in traffic volume – depends on policy choices. Hence, policy guiding the introduction of 
connected and automated vehicles is made under uncertainty. It is well-known that normative criteria of 
rationality, i.e. rules for identifying the ”best” choice in a set of alternative choices, break down under 
uncertainty (Dorfman 1962). Policy guiding and regulating the introduction of connected and automated cars 
will resemble a process of trial-and-error, or learning-by-doing, rather than a well-controlled and fully planned 
process. 
 
It seems more likely that non-automated driving, of both motorcycles and cars, will continue to be permitted. 
A principle of not allowing avoidable risks is difficult, if not to say impossible, to implement consistently. It 
implies, for example, that all vehicles must be of equal mass, as differences in mass generate external risks 
that can be avoided by eliminating differences in vehicle size and weight. 
Rune Elvik 
https://journals.aau.dk/index.php/djtr ISSN 2596-9196 11 
Discussion and conclusions 
The paper started by asking if the impacts of connected and automated vehicles can be predicted. The answers 
to the question is that many of these impacts depend on the policies implemented to regulate the introduction 
of connected and automated vehicles. This applies particularly to two of the impacts that are difficult to 
predict: whether vehicle automation will be associated with a transition to electric vehicles, and whether it 
will be associated with a transition to shared mobility.  
 
It is more likely that automated cars will be electric than that they will have combustion engines. However, to 
make a transition to electric cars more likely and speed it up, policies favouring electric cars may be necessary. 
Norwegian experience shows that a transition to electric cars can be stimulated by public policy.  
 
Studies (e.g. Clayton et al. 2020) consistently show that individual use of automated cars is preferred to shared 
use. If the introduction of connected and automated cars is left to the market, it is likely that individual car 
ownership will continue at current rates. In that case, traffic is likely to increase, as the generalised cost of 
travel will be lower in automated cars than in manual cars, chiefly because the value of travel time savings is 
likely to become lower. Travel time is less burdensome and less wasted if it can be used to work or relax. An 
increase in traffic will reduce the benefits of connected and automated cars in terms of less congestion, fewer 
accidents and less emissions. 
 
If this prediction is accepted, policies aimed at maximising the societal benefits of connected and automated 
cars may, perhaps paradoxically, need to counteract some of the private benefits of these cars. Experience 
shows that whenever transport becomes cheaper and more convenient, the demand for it increases. In 
economic terms, the societal benefit of an increase in travel demand is the increase in consumer surplus 
associated with it. However, as noted, an increase in travel demand increases the external impacts of travel in 
terms of congestion, accidents and pollution. 
 
Estimates of impacts made in Levitate suggest that even if there is an increase in traffic volume, there will still 
be a net gain in travel time, a reduction of accidents and a reduction of pollution. While the reductions are 
smaller than they would have been without increased traffic volume, they are not eliminated. Thus, all 
potential impacts remain favourable. In view of this, it is unlikely that policy makers will introduce controversial 
and often unpopular measures like road pricing or parking restrictions to curb the growth of traffic. 
 
It is concluded that, at the current state of knowledge, it is predicted that connected and automated vehicles 
will lead to increased travel demand, but nevertheless reduce travel time, make travel time less wasteful, 
reduce accidents and  reduce pollution, including global warming. 
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